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Abstract 
Do firms choose inputs that minimize their cost of production, ignoring the attitudes of their owners 
and employees? We examine this question using an episode of worsening relations between the US 
and France: from February 2002 to March 2003, France's favorability rating in US public opinion 
polls fell from 83 percent to 35 percent. Very negative attitudes towards France became common even 
among college educated Americans with high levels of income, so they were likely prevalent among 
managers. Using data from 1999-2005, we find that the worsening relations reduced US imports from 
France by about 15 percent and US exports to France by about 8 percent, compared to other Eurozone 
or OECD countries. This decline was due in large part to a fall in France's share of the quantity of 
inputs traded between the Eurozone and the US; this decline is significant even after we control for 
changes in the product composition of trade flows. We also find that the decline in trade w  as 
accompanied by a similar drop in both business trips and tourist visitations of US residents to France 
compared to Western Europe. Taken together, our findings suggest that competition cannot eliminate 
the effect of attitudes on firms' choice of inputs. 
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ISBN 978 0 85328 042 2 1 Introduction
Economists often assume that ﬁrms choose inputs to minimize their cost of production.
In other words, we typically assume that "business is business," and attitudes do not aﬀect
input choices. This assumption is diﬃcult to test, because unobserved characteristics may
aﬀect the suitability of inputs and input suppliers. Firms may ignore attitudes and still pay
more to members of groups that supply better inputs.
To control for unobserved inputs characteristics, we consider a change in international
relations that aﬀects attitudes, but does not involve a risk of bilateral war, threats of violence,
economic sanctions, or even the imposition of substantial tariﬀs. Neoclassical theory tells
us that consumption choices of consumers and governments take attitudes into account, but
ﬁrms should continue to choose the cheapest inputs. As Becker explains in his seminal work
on discrimination (1957): perfect competition eliminates ﬁrms whose choice of inputs reﬂects
any considerations other than cost minimization.
But as Becker himself shows, a ﬁrm that earns rents may stay in business even if it does
not minimize its cost of production. Agency problems within the ﬁrm can further magnify
the eﬀect of attitudes on the choice of inputs. For example, overseas travel may be required
for sales or purchases, and managers’ private beneﬁts from business trips may diminish when
attitudes worsen. Or managers may exert more eﬀort to ﬁnd alternative suppliers if they are
negatively disposed towards the country of the current supplier. Attitudes outside the ﬁrm
may also aﬀect its choice of inputs. For example, a ﬁrm may base its decisions on perceived
beneﬁts from politicians, or politicians’ statements (and general public sentiment) may aﬀect
the legitimacy of accommodating the attitudes of individuals within the ﬁrm.
In addition to informing our understanding of ﬁrm behavior, the study of the eﬀects of
attitudes also sheds light on the robustness of global trade ﬂows. Historically, international
attitudes and relations seem to have mattered for trade: the ratio of world trade to gross
domestic product increased before the First World War, declined during the Interwar period,
and increased again in recent decades (Irwin 2002). Moreover, recent work (Guiso et al. 2005)
1ﬁnds that national attitudes are still correlated with patterns of trade.
In order to examine whether this relationship is causal, we require variation in interna-
tional relations that aﬀects attitudes, but little else. In this paper, we examine the dete-
rioration of relations between the US and France, which took place from 2002-2003. The
US government tried to obtain a United Nations (UN) Security Council mandate to use
military force against Iraq, and the French government opposed this move; the resulting
standoﬀ worsened US public opinion of France. The fraction of US Gallup Poll respondents
who viewed France favorably declined from 83 percent in February 2002 to 35 percent in
March 2003, and recovered only to 57 percent in February 2006.1 Negative views of France
became prevalent at all levels of education and income; in March 2003, about a third of the
respondents with a college degree and household income above $75,000 had a "very nega-
tive" view of France, and a third had a "mostly negative" view. This suggests that negative
attitudes towards France were probably common among managers. By contrast, attitudes
towards Germany worsened much less and recovered quite quickly, and attitudes towards the
UK, Spain, and Italy changed very little. The US administration also singled out France in
particular: Condoleeza Rice, who was the President’s National Security Advisor, was quoted
in March 2003 as telling associates to "Punish France, ignore Germany and forgive Russia"
(Reuters, 2003). There were also calls in the media to ban French product (Fox News, 2003)
and the House of Representatives cafeteria began to serve “Freedom Fries” instead of “French
Fries” (BBC, 2006), prompting the title of this paper. A parallel (though smaller) change in
attitudes took place in France, where the favorability of the US fell from 63 percent in 2002
to 43 percent in 2003 (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006).
This shock to the relations between France and the US provides us with a good opportu-
nity to examine the eﬀect of attitudes on trade. First, as discussed above, we have evidence
on the timing, the magnitude, and the causes of the change in attitudes. This is important,
because in other circumstances international trade may aﬀect attitudes. For example, per-
1We have data on this question since 1991: the fraction who viewed France favorably was around 80
percent until 2002.
2ceived gains from trade may motivate the US and China to improve relations and attitudes;
at the same time, increased trade may cause Americans to fear that China threatens their
jobs. But in the case of the US and France, we have clear reasons for the worsening attitudes,
and these reasons are unrelated to trade.
Second, the shock to attitudes allows us to net out ﬁxed eﬀects that characterize the
suitability of French-produced inputs for US ﬁrms, and vice versa. This is an important
advantage, because in many studies of labor market discrimination it is diﬃcult to sep-
arate worker characteristics that aﬀect production from those that only aﬀect employers’
attitudes.2 Our study therefore complements research on labor market discrimination (e.g.
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004).
Third, the setting we study avoids the problem that worsening attitudes may be correlated
with increased risk. For example, there is evidence that war decreases trade (Martin, Mayer,
and Thoenig 2006) and even lower levels of violence can aﬀect economic outcomes (Abadie
and Gardeazabal 2003). But trade between the US and France does not involve more risk
than trade between other developed countries.
F o u r t h ,w ec a nu s eo t h e rc o u n t r i e si nt h eO r ganization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) or the Eurozone as plausible counterfactuals for France.3 This allows
us to net out short run changes in trade with the US that may have taken place in absence
of the worsening relations with France. The use of Eurozone countries as controls has the
added beneﬁt that exchange rate ﬂuctuations do not aﬀe c tF r a n c er e l a t i v et ot h i sg r o u p .
Comparing France to OECD or Eurozone countries from 1999-2005, we estimate that US
imports from France would have been signiﬁcantly higher at the end of this period if US
r e l a t i o n sw i t hF r a n c eh a dn o td e t e r i o r a t e d .T h e r ei sa l s os o m ee v i d e n c et h a tU Se x p o r t st o
France would have been higher. We ﬁnd that this decline in trade cannot be explained by
2O n ec o u l du s eas i m i l a rs t r a t e g yt os t u d yt h ee ﬀect of attitudes on French workers in the US or US
workers in France. However, this strategy faces the challenge that wages and employment relations are
highly persistent, and negative attiditudes may aﬀect incoming and outgoing migration. Small sample sizes
may also make it diﬃcult to study new hiring in most datasets.
3We include Greece, whose entry to the Eurozone was delayed until 2001, and exclude Slovania, who
joined the Eurozone in 2007.
3an aggregate drop in French trade with the OECD.
The availability of product-level trade data allows us to address other concerns about our
identiﬁcation strategy. For example, changes in the composition of US demand and supply
or in the tariﬀ structure may have aﬀected France more than other countries. But we ﬁnd
that most of the decline in France’s share of US trade with the Eurozone is attributable to a
fall in its share of trade within 4-digit product categories.4 This decline does not reﬂect pre-
existing trends, and it is not driven by outliers. Interestingly, the decline is almost entirely
due to a signiﬁcant drop in quantities, and there is little change in the price of goods traded
with France, compared to the control group. Taken together, our estimates suggest that
the worsening relations reduced US imports from France by about 15 percentage points (or
about 5 billion dollars in 2005) US exports to France by about 8 percentage points (or about
2 billion dollars in 2005).5
Having examined the aggregate eﬀect of relations on trade, we go on to examine the roles
of diﬀerent economic agents in bringing about this change. Using US input-output tables,
we identify 2-digit commodity classes where 75 percent or more of US consumption in 1999
is attributable to each of three groups: government, consumers, or ﬁrms. Trade between the
US and France in commodities used predominantly by government was roughly halved as
a result of the worsening relations. But the only commodities in this category are types of
ordnance, and they accounted for much less than 1 percent of trade in 1999; so this decline
had little impact on aggregate trade ﬂows.6 Estimates of the eﬀect of relations on imports
of commodities used primarily by consumers are less precise, but there is some evidence of
a decline in US exports of these goods to France.7 Finally and most importantly, we ﬁnd a
4Tariﬀs are imposed by product, so changes in countries’ shares within product categories are unlikely
to be driven by tariﬀ changes. Moreover, average tariﬀs on French commodities are still very low (Gresser
2005).
5This decline amounts to about 0.2-0.3 percent of US international trade and about 0.4-1.2 percent of
France’s international trade in 2005.
6Our ﬁndings are consistent with recent work on the role of political considerations in trade negotiations
(Grossman and Helpman 1994; Maggi and Goldberg 1999) and in the provision of foreign aid (Kuziemko
and Werker 2006).
7Chavis and Leslie (2006) ﬁnd evidence of a short-lived boycott on French wine, which reduced US demand
for a few months in 2003.
4decline of approximately 12-15 percentage points in trade of commodities used primarily as
ﬁrms’ inputs (these commodities account for almost half of the trade between the US and
France). We ﬁnd that this decline is due to a fall in France’s share of the quantity of goods
traded within 4-digit commodity classes.
Worsening attitudes did not only reduce trade between the US and France: they also
reduced travel between these two countries. We ﬁnd that both business travel and tourist
visitations from the US to France declined compared to the ﬂows to Western Europe.8 This
suggests that US businesspeople may have been less inclined to travel to France, and this
may have contributed to the decline in trade.
But even if worsening attitudes reduced private beneﬁts of managers from travel and
trade, we may still be concerned that the cost of changing input suppliers might be too
high. Yet we ﬁnd that France’s share (and the US’s share) of exports of 4-digit commodities
within the OECD rarely accounts for more than a quarter. This evidence, together with
the availability of domestic alternatives, suggests that the ﬁrms’ rents likely allowed them
to bear the cost of accommodating the change in attitudes.
Taken together, our results suggest that attitudes aﬀect ﬁrms’ choice of inputs. These
ﬁndings are consistent with Bandiera et al. (2006), who ﬁnd that in absence of suﬃcient
incentives managers tend to favor their compatriots. Along with other recent evidence
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004), our ﬁndings suggest that competition may be insuﬃ-
cient to eliminate the eﬀects of discrimination in the market.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the deterioration of
the bilateral relations between the US and France. Section 3 investigates the impact of this
deterioration on aggregate trade ﬂows between these two countries. Section 4 examine the
eﬀects of ﬁrms, consumers, and government on trade. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
8We also ﬁnd a drop in France’s share of tourist visitations from Western Europe to the US.
52 Deterioration of Relations Between US and France
This section examines the deterioration of relations between the US and France from 2002-
2003, and its eﬀect on attitudes. The crisis began in 2002, when the US tried to obtain a UN
Security Council mandate to use military force against Iraq, against the strong objections
of France. Other European governments were divided in their position: some supported the
US, while others were closer to France. But France was in a diﬀerent position from other
Western European countries. First, it had the right to veto Security Council resolutions; the
other longtime US ally with veto power, UK, supported the US. Second, it was more active
in opposing the US eﬀorts (CNN 2003).
We document the resulting change in US public opinion towards France using Gallup
Polls. People were asked for their "overall opinion of [country x]: very favorable, mostly
favorable, mostly unfavorable, very unfavorable". Figure 1 shows the favorability rating of
5 major European countries (the fraction of respondents who had a "very favorable" or a
"mostly favorable" opinion). From January 1991 to February 2002 there was little change in
attitudes towards the UK, France and Germany; all three countries had favorability ratings
that ﬂuctuated around 75-95 percent. But from February 2002 to March 2003, France’s
favorability rating plummeted from 83 percent to 35 percent, recovering only to 57 percent
in February 2006. By contrast, the decline in attitudes towards Germany was much smaller
and shorter lived. At the same time, US attitudes towards the UK were mostly unchanged.
Data for Italy and Spain, although available only twice for each country, suggests that
attitudes towards those countries were also mostly unaﬀected, especially compared to the
attitudes towards France.
The negative attitude towards France in the US was both widespread and strong. In
February 2002, only 4 percent of US respondents had a "very unfavorable" view of France,
and 16 percent had a "somewhat unfavorable view". But in March 2003, about 40 percent
had a "very unfavorable" view of France, and about 26 percent had a "somewhat unfavorable"
view. Among respondents who completed college and whose household income was above
6$75,000, about 33 percent had a "very unfavorable" opinion of France, and about 34 reported
a "somewhat unfavorable" opinion. This suggests that negative attitude towards France was
likely common among decision makers in the economy, including ﬁrm owners and managers.
The evidence that US relations with France were adversely aﬀected is not restricted to
public opinion polls. Condoleeza Rice, who was then the National Security Advisor, was
quoted in March 2003 as having told associates that the US should "Punish France, ignore
Germany and forgive Russia" (Reuters, March 2003). There were also calls to boycott
French goods: journalist Bill O’Reilly wrote that his column continues to "boycott French
goods, things made in France, not things made by Americans with French labels." (Fox
News 2003). And two members of the US House of Representatives, Robert Ney and Walter
Jones, decided to change the name "French Fries" to "Freedom Fries" on the House of
Representatives’ cafeteria menu (BBC 2006).
The change in relations and attitudes was not restricted to one side of the Atlantic:
favorable opinion of the US in France declined from 63 percent in 2002 to 43 percent in 2003,
reaching 39 percent in 2006. But at the same time, attitudes towards the US worsened in
Great Britain, Germany, and Spain, though not as quickly as in France (Pew Global Attitudes
Project, 2006). Taken together, these ﬁgures suggest that the worsening relations between
the US and France, compared to US relations with other Western European countries, may
be due more to changes in US attitudes than to changes in French attitudes.
Although the evidence presented thus far indicates a rapid deterioration of relations be-
tween the US and France, it is not clear that trade between these countries should have been
aﬀected. Both countries have signed trade agreements (e.g. the World Trade Organization),
and both have shown commitment to reduce global trade barriers over several decades. The
question we address in the next section is: did worsening attitudes aﬀect trade ﬂows?
73E ﬀect of Relations on Trade Between US and France
In this section we examine how the deterioration of international relations between US and
France aﬀected their bilateral trade. We begin by using Comtrade data to examine the
changes in US imports from France and from other countries. Figure 2 shows that the
growth of US imports from France seems to have slowed down from 2002 onwards, compared
to the growth in its imports from other Eurozone and OECD countries. The ﬁgure also
shows suggestive evidence that US exports to France may have declined. The changes are
presented relative to 1999, since the exchange rates between Eurozone countries were ﬁxed
on 31 December 1998. Note that after the implementation of the Euro and before the shock
to the relations between the US and France, US imports from France seem to have trended
very similarly to US imports from other Eurozone countries.
Having examined the trends, we now estimate the following parsimonious speciﬁcation
using a panel of US imports from OECD countries:
ln(PQjt)=βFrancej(Ye a r t > 2002) + δYeart + ηCountryj + εjt. (1)
The estimates in Panel A of Table 1 use this speciﬁcation, where the outcome, PQ jt denotes
the value of US imports from exporter country j at year t, Francej is an indicator for France,
and Ye a r t and Countryj are vectors of year and country indicators. The data are in nominal
US dollars, using C.I.F. (Cost, Insurance and Freight) prices - the price of goods in the US
port of arrival.
Our speciﬁcation treats 1999-2001 as "pre-crisis" years, and 2003-2005 as "post-crisis"
years.9 The choice of 3 years before and after 2002 reﬂects a tradeoﬀ between diﬀerent
considerations. It allows the change in attitude ample time to aﬀect trade ﬂows, and mitigates
measurement error problems that may arise when using year-to-year variation. At the same
9We also consider 2002 a "pre-crisis" year, assuming that the eﬀect of relations on trade may have taken
time to materialize, but our estimates are almost unchanged if we repeat the analysis excluding the data for
2002.
8time, we avoid using a longer period where spurious changes in supply and demand could
aﬀect our estimates, and 1999 oﬀers a convenient start date because of the implementation
of the Euro.
The baseline result shows that US imports from France declined by about 19 percentage
points compared to imports from other OECD countries after relations worsened. Other
columns show that this result is robust to using 1999 imports as regression weights, and to
discarding the data for 2002. We estimate this regression using data on US imports from
OECD countries, assuming that in the short run these countries are plausible controls for
France. Eurozone countries are attractive controls because of their similarity to France; the
drawback of using only Eurozone countries is that the sample becomes smaller. In practice,
the results for US imports change little when we use Eurozone countries as controls.
Panel B of Table 1 shows estimates of speciﬁcation 1 using US exports instead of imports.
Export data are in nominal US dollars, using F.O.B. (Free On Board) prices - the price
of goods in the exporting country’s port of origin.10 The results suggest that worsening
relations reduced trade by about 8 percentage points compared to other OECD countries.
The estimate using Eurozone countries, though not precise, is similar in magnitude to the
estimates using the OECD countries.11
While these estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that worsening attitudes reduced
trade, they may also reﬂect a decline in French trade for reasons that are unrelated to its
relations with the US. But Figure 3 suggests that French trade with other OECD partners
actually grew more rapidly from 2002.12 It is possible that France compensated for the loss
10We follow the standard practice of using C.I.F. prices for imports and F.O.B. prices for exports.
11Since we are considering the eﬀect on US trade with a single country, France, we may be concerned
about the precision of the estimates in Table 1. We re-ran the speciﬁcation in Column 1 of Table 1, replacing
the indicator for France with an indicator for each of the other Eurozone countries. We then averaged the
coeﬃcients for each country from the US imports and export regressions. We found that France’s average
coeﬃcient was the second most negative after that of Luxemburg (the smallest Eurozone country).
12As a further check of our previous results, we estimate a "triple diﬀerence" regression similar to speciﬁ-
cation 1, where the dependent variable is log trade with the US or with the rest of the OECD (this avoids
zero or near zero trade between smaller trade partners when using logs). The regressor of interest is an
indicator for trade between the US and France after 2002, and we include a full set of interactions. The
estimates for US imports and exports are -.101 (.042) and -.034 (.026).
9of a major trade partner by increasing eﬀort to trade elsewhere, since the US accounted for
about 11 percent of French trade with the OECD in 2001.13
Having found evidence of a decline in trade between the US and France, we now examine
more closely the timing of the change in trade and compare it to the timing of the change
in attitudes. Since Comtrade data are annual, we use US Census monthly data on imports
and exports. Because the monthly data are volatile, we calculate the average of France’s
s h a r eo fU Si m p o r t sf r o mt h eE u r o z o n ea n di t ss h a r eo fU Se x p o r t st ot h eE u r o z o n ef o re a c h
month from 1999-2005. We then regress this average share on month ﬁxed eﬀects and plot
the residuals in Figure 4. The results suggest that France’s share began to decline around
December 2002, which seems consistent with the Gallup Poll evidence.14
Despite the evidence on the timing of the decline in trade, we might still be concerned
that the change in trade might not have been only due to attitudes. For example, following
the events of 11 September 2001, demand for air travel may have declined. This decline may
have reduced demand for airplanes, which were an important export from France to the US.
More generally, we would like to control for changes in the composition of US imports due
to changes in demand. Similarly, we want to analyze changes in US exports to France net
of supply shocks. Finally, we would like to alleviate concerns that the decline in trade was
driven by fears that the US may increase tariﬀs on products where France is a key exporter.15
In order to address these issues, we consider France’s share in US trade with the Eurozone
within each 4 digit commodity group.16 Analyzing changes within 4 digit commodity groups
also allows us to determine the role of prices and quantities in the relative decline of US
13By contrast, France accounted for less than 4 percent of US trade with the OECD in the same year.
Moreover, the US is a much more closed economy. Therefore, it is likely that any "compensation" eﬀect on
behalf of the US towards its other trade partners was likely much smaller.
14Appendix Figure A1. shows similar ﬁgures for all 12 Eurozone countries. None of these countries shows
a large and rapid drop similar to the one France experienced around December 2002.
15In practice, tariﬀs on commodities traded between the US and France are still very low (Gresser 2005),
and the imposition of tariﬀs was likely to have caused a costly trade war between the US and the European
Union. Even a Wall Street op-ed supporting the boycott of French commodities argues that raising tariﬀsi s
costly (Fund 2003).
16We focus on the Eurozone and not the OECD because there are more than 1,000 four digit commodity
groups, so we prefer to use countries that are similar to France.
10trade with France. In order to analyze the changes in total trade, prices, and quantities, we
estimate the following regressions:
Yit = β(Ye a r t > 2002) + δCommodityi + εit, (2)
where Commodityi are ﬁxed eﬀects for France’s share of each commodity. We run this
regression where the dependent variable, Yit,i sF r a n c e ’ ss h a r ei nt h ev a l u eo ft r a d ew i t ht h e
Eurozone, (QFiPFi)/(QiPi), or the logarithm of this expression.17 For commodities where
quantity data are available separately, we also run this regression using the logarithms of
France’s share in trade value (QFiPFi)/(QiPi), it’s share in quantities (QFi)/(Qi), and the
relative average price of French commodities, (PFi)/(Pi)≡ ((QFiPFi)/(QiPi))/((QFi)/(Qi)).
The results in Table 2 show that the decline in US trade with France is due almost entirely
to a change in quantities, not prices. This ﬁnding is consistent with a decline in demand,
coupled with highly elastic supply.
We now use "within product" variation in France’s share of US trade with Eurozone coun-
tries to further examine the change in trade after 1999. The left hand side of Figure 5 shows










where I is the number of commodities. The ﬁgure shows that France’s share was stable
at around 0.17-0.18 from 1991-2001, and then declined to around 0.15 in 2005. France’s
share of US exports was around 0.15-0.16 from 1991-2001, and then declined to about 0.14
in 2005. The right hand side of Figure 5 shows a similar drop after 2001 for the median
French share of US imports and exports. Taken together, these results show that the decline
in trade between US and France was not driven by pre-existing trends or by a handful of
large commodities or by a large change within an unimportant class of commodities; rather,
i tw a sap e r v a s i v ed e c l i n ea c r o s sab r o a dr a n g eo fc o m m o d i t i e s .
Having found a signiﬁcant drop in France’s share of trade with the US, we now evaluate
the magnitude of this decline. Our regression estimates in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that US
17For convenience we omit the subscript t.
11imports from France fell by about 13-21 percent, and US exports to France fell by about
6-13 percent. Our estimates may be slightly upward biased if other US trade partners
"beneﬁtted" from shifting business to them. Conversely, these estimates may be slightly
downward biased if commodities are bundled together for shipment to (or from) Europe,
making other European destinations less favorable when trade with France declines. Taking
these considerations into account, our preferred estimate is that US imports from France
declined by about 15 percent, or about $5 billion in 2005 prices. Similarly, we estimate that
US exports to France declined by about 8 percent, or about $2 billion in 2005 prices.
These estimates of the eﬀect of relations and attitudes on international trade are sizeable.
For example, Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2007) estimate that the eﬀect of WTO
membership or sharing a common language on bilateral trade is approximately 10 percent.
Our ﬁndings therefore suggest that a large and rapid decline in relations can reduce trade
quite considerably.
Our ﬁndings in this section show that the deteriorating relations and attitudes between
the US and France signiﬁcantly reduced their bilateral trade. What can explain this eﬀect?
Our next section examines this question in detail, by looking at the mechanisms through
w h i c hw o r s e n i n gm a yh a v er e d u c e dt r a d e .I np a r t i c u l a r ,w ef o c u so nt r a d ei nﬁrms’ inputs.
4 Are Firms Responsible for the Decline in Trade?
In order to assess the role of diﬀerent economic agents on the ﬂow of trade between the
US and France, we would have liked to analyze ﬁrm-level transactions. Unfortunately,our
data is not suﬃciently detailed, so we use evidence on the type of goods that governments,
consumers, and ﬁrms are likely to use. Using US input-output tables for 1999 from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, we calculate the fraction of total US consumption of each
2-digit commodity group due to government, ﬁrms, and consumers. We then identify 2-
digit commodity groups where more than 75 percent of consumption is due to each of the
12following: government, ﬁrms, or consumers.18
The results in Table 3 show that there is a single 2-digit commodity group category -
ordnance - where the government accounted for more than 75 percent of US consumption in
1999; ordnance accounted for less than 1 percent of US imports from France in 1999. There
are 7 commodity groups where personal consumption accounted for more than 75 percent of
US consumption; total French imports in these categories accounted for less than 6 percent
of US imports from France in 1999. Finally, there are 33 commodity groups for which ﬁrms’
intermediate inputs accounted for more than 75 percent of US consumption in 1999. Total
imports in these categories accounted for more than 46 percent of US imports from France
in 1999.
Based on this classiﬁcation of commodity groups, we re-run the regression in (1) using
only the commodities in each of the three categories. The top panel of Table 4 shows a
large drop in US imports of ordnance from France. US exports of ordnance to France appear
to have declined even more rapidly. The ﬁnding in the second panel shows that there was
very little change in US imports of French commodities consumed mainly by consumers.
There appears to have been a decline in US exports to France of commodities consumed
by consumers, but the estimates are typically not very precise. Finally, there is a decline
of about 15 percent in both imports and exports of commodities used primarily as ﬁrms’
intermediate inputs between the US and France.
We further examine the eﬀects of attitudes on trade in ﬁrms’ inputs by estimating the
same speciﬁcations as reported in Table 2, this time only for commodities used primarily by
ﬁr m s .T h er e s u l t s( T a b l e5 )t h a tF r a n c e ’ ss h a re of US imports of inputs from the Eurozone
fell by about 14-15 percent, and its share in exports fell by about 12-13 percent. The decline
in ﬁrms’ trade was due almost entirely to reduced quantities, and not to a change in prices.
These results may reﬂect a decline in demand, coupled with elastic supply for US (French)
ﬁrms trading with France (the US).
18Our results are robust to using diﬀerent cutoﬀs.
13How do we interpret the impact of governments, consumers and ﬁrms on the response of
trade to changing attitudes? We examine each of these in turn, beginning with the role of
governments. Our ﬁnding that worsening relations reduced trade in commodities consumed
primarily by governments is consistent with the view that both governments punished each
other. This ﬁnding is consistent with economic theory: governments’ role in international
markets likely reﬂects political considerations as well as cost minimization (e.g. Grossman
and Helpman 1994). This result is also related to recent work, which shows that domestic
political considerations aﬀect trade negotiations (e.g. Goldberg and Maggi 1999) and that
international aid transfers reﬂect political bargaining between governments (Kuziemko and
Werker 2006). But although the drop in trade of ordnance between the US and France was
steep, it can only account for a small fraction of the aggregate decline in trade between the
US and France.
Having examined the role of governments, we now turn our attention to consumers.
Economic theory tells us that consumers’ choice of products reﬂects their preferences, so a
decline in demand for French goods would not be surprising. Table 4 shows a marginally
signiﬁcant drop in US exports of commodities consumed mostly by consumers, and imprecise
estimates for US imports of these commodities. Chavis and Leslie (2006) ﬁnd evidence of
a boycott on French wine, which reduced sales of French wine by approximately 13 percent
over about 6 months in 2003. To examine the possibility of a longer term impact, we focus
on 17 four digit commodity groups where US consumers were more likely to have identiﬁed
French goods (see Appendix Table A1). We then re-estimate the speciﬁcations in the ﬁrst two
columns of the top panel of Table 2 using only these commodities. The estimated coeﬃcients
of interest are negative and about 2-3 times larger than the corresponding coeﬃcients in Table
2, though the p-value for the t-test are about 0.15-0.3. In addition, as we report below, there
was a large decline in US tourism to France, and vice versa. Taken together, these results
suggest that the eﬀect of attitudes on consumers’ choices may have been restricted by two
diﬀerent forces. In many cases, consumers may not have known that a particular good was
14produced in France, so their attitudes did not matter; and when they did identify a good
as French (e.g. due to a brand name), it may have been costly for them to ﬁnd a good
substitute.19
Despite the visibility of trade in consumer goods, trade in commodities used as ﬁrm inputs
is quantitatively much more important. Analyzing the eﬀect of international relations on
ﬁrm inputs is also more interesting from a theoretical perspective. In his seminal work on
Discrimination, Becker (1957) shows that in a perfectly competitive economy, ﬁrms whose
input choice is aﬀected by considerations other than cost minimization are driven out of the
market. According to this reasoning, we should expect the change in attitudes to have little
impact on trade in inputs.
But despite this argument, attitudes may still aﬀect trade in inputs even for proﬁtm a x i -
mizing ﬁrms. For example, Besley and Ghatak (2006) characterize a competitive equilibrium
where some ﬁrms provide public goods along with the private goods they sell. In the setting
we consider, ﬁrms may avoid trade with a country if some consumers see this trade as a
"public bad," although these ﬁrms would need to advertise their input choice and charge
higher prices. Another possibility is that ﬁrms might reduce trade with a foreign country
in exchange for some beneﬁts from politicians. But even if we cannot rule out these two
channels, we could ﬁnd no evidence for such behavior on the part of ﬁrms.
While attitudes outside ﬁrms probably had little direct impact on trade in inputs between
the US and France, they may have legitimized the decisions of individuals within ﬁrms. As
Becker himself notes, ﬁrms that earn rents can survive even if they take owners’ attitudes
into account in when choosing their inputs. Agency problems within the ﬁrm can further
magnify the eﬀect of attitudes on the choice of input suppliers. For example, managers may
be more willing to exert eﬀort to ﬁnd an alternative supplier if they are negatively disposed
towards the country of the current supplier. And the change in attitudes may aﬀect private
beneﬁts that managers derive from overseas travel. If managers are less inclined to travel to
19Broda and Weinstein (2006) ﬁnd that substitution elasticities across commodities from diﬀerent countries
are higher for undiﬀerentiated goods than for diﬀerentiated goods.
15Paris (or New York), they may do so less often, reducing their ability to sell their products
overseas.
Is there evidence that the worsening relations aﬀected bilateral travel? Using data from
the Oﬃce of Travel and Tourism Industries for 1995-2005, we construct an estimate of the
number of US resident travelers visitations to France and Western Europe.20 These data
are noisy, since they report total outgoing travel and the percent of the total who traveled
to each destination (e.g. 7% of US business travelers in 2005 went to France). Despite the
imprecision, Figure 6 shows that US travel to France and western Europe followed similar
trends before relations worsened, although there was an overall decline in travel to Western
Europe after 2001, probably because of the events of September 11. But the diﬀerential
decline in travel to France (compared to Western Europe) from the 1999-2001 average to the
2003-2005 average was about 18 percentage points for business and convention travel and
about 17 percentage points for other types of travel.
Figure 7 shows that there was also a large decline in travel to the US from France and
other Western European countries after 2001. The diﬀerential decline in travel to France
(compared to Western Europe) from the 1999-2001 average to the 2003-2005 average was only
2 percent for Business travelers and about 12 percent for tourist travel. But even business
travel to France showed a marked decline in 2003, when US attitudes towards France were
at their worst, and the recovery (again, relative to Western Europe) was only attained in
2005.
Although the evidence presented here suggests that worsening attitudes aﬀected business
travel and business transactions between the US and France, we might still be concerned that
magnitude of the eﬀect is quite large. Even if attitudes become hostile and agents are moti-
vated to act upon them, is it simply too costly to take these preferences into account when
choosing trade partners? Although we have no direct evidence on the cost of substituting
French (US) commodities with other commodities, we ﬁnd that in most 4-digit commodities
20Travelers can report multiple destinations, so the data for Western Europe excludes people who visited
France and other Western European countries.
16France’s share (or the US’s share) rarely accounted for more than a quarter of trade within
the OECD. If we take into account that in many cases domestically produced alternatives
also exist, it seems plausible that in many cases ﬁr m sw e r ea b l et oﬁnd alternatives to French
(or US) imports that were close in their attributes and price.
Our ﬁnding that attitudes can aﬀect business decisions is related to other recent empirical
evidence. In a ﬁeld experiment, Bandiera et al. (2006) ﬁnd that managers tend to favor
their compatriots; this favoritism disappears when incentives are introduced. Our results can
be viewed as complementary: increased non-pecuniary incentives may shift ﬁrm behavior
away from proﬁt maximization. Our results also complement the ﬁndings of Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2004) that resumes carrying "black sounding" names receive fewer callbacks
from potential employees, even when other resume attributes are randomly assigned. These
results all suggest that competition is unlikely to eliminate the eﬀects of attitudes on input
choices.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We examine the deterioration of relations between the US and France from 2002-2003, which
worsened Americans’ attitudes towards France (and vice versa). This change in attitudes was
common even among well-educated people with a high level of income, so it likely aﬀected
many managers. At the same time, the worsening relations were not associated with an
increase in personal risk or tariﬀ barriers. This change provides an interesting source setting
for examining the eﬀect of attitudes on ﬁrms’ choice of inputs.
We ﬁnd that US imports from France fell by about 15 percent and US exports to France
fell by about 8 percent, compared to other Eurozone or OECD countries. This decline was
due in large part to a fall in France’s share in the quantity of inputs traded with the US;
t h ed e c l i n ew a sl a r g ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant even within 4-digit product categories. We also ﬁnd a
similarly large decline in both US business trips and tourist visitations to France, suggesting
17that worsening relations did indeed aﬀect transactions between ﬁrms.
One interesting aspect of the experiment we analyze is that it is diﬃcult to rationalize
the decline in trade of inputs using standard arguments of cost minimization. The attributes
of inputs produced in the France (the US) and by competing input producers, and the char-
acteristics of ﬁrms’ production processes in the US (France) are not likely to have changed in
the short run. This suggests that tastes, and not only simple cost-minimizing calculations,
may aﬀect ﬁrms’ choice of inputs.
Our results also suggest that international trade ﬂows may be sensitive to large changes in
relations and attitudes. We conclude that the eﬀect of attitudes may be particularly strong
where there are strong incentives to punish a foreign country, as in the case of commodities
used by governments, or where the availability of close substitutes lowers the cost of changing
a ﬁrm’s input suppliers. This result may be especially important for understanding the
robustness of trade ﬂows between Western countries and other important trade partners.
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20Baseline Weighted Excluding 2002 Eurozone Only
France*(Year>2002) -0.19 -0.18 -0.21 -0.17
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 203 203 174 84
France*(Year>2002) -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Observations 203 203 174 84
B.  Dependent Variable: Log US Exports
NOTES. This table reports estimates of regressions of log value of trade on an indicator for France interacted with an indicator for the period after 2002, when relations between the 
two countries deteriorated. All the regressions control for exporting (importing) country fixed effects and time effects. The baseline specification uses CIF (FOB) prices in nominal 
US dollars for import (export) regressions for OECD trading partners from 1999-2005. The weighted specification uses 1999 exports (imports) as weights. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by exporting (importing) country in the panel regressions.
Table 1.  Effect of Worsening Relations between US and France on Bilateral Trade
As Baseline, Except:
A.  Dependent Variable: Log US Imports(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable (QfPf)/(QP) ln((QfPf)/(QP)) ln((QfPf)/(QP)) ln(Qf/Q) ln(Pf/P)
Year>2002 -0.015 -0.131 -0.138 -0.130 -0.008
(0.003) (0.023) (0.026) (0.038) (0.023)
Observations 8,246 7,527 6,316 6,316 6,316
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable (QfPf)/(QP) ln((QfPf)/(QP)) ln((QfPf)/(QP)) ln(Qf/Q) ln(Pf/P)
Year>2002 -0.014 -0.128 -0.117 -0.146 0.030
(0.004) (0.026) (0.031) (0.038) (0.022)
Observations 8,519 7,717 6,309 6,309 6,309
Only Commodities with Price Data
Table 2.  The Effect of Relations on France's Share of US Trade with Eurozone (Within 4-Digit Commodities)
NOTES. This table reports coefficients from regressions of measures of France's share of US trade with Eurozone on an indicator for the period after 2002. The dependent variable in 
column (1) is France's share of the value of US trade with the Eurozone; the dependent variable in columns (2) and (3) is the logarithm of France's share of the value of US trade with 
the Eurozone;  the dependent variable in column (4) is the logarithm of France's share of the quantity of US trade with the Eurozone; and the dependent variable in column (5) is the 
logarithm of the average price of French commodities divided by the average price of Eurozone commodities. All the regressions control for commodity fixed effects. The data are 




Only Commodities with Price Data Entire Sample









Share of Total 
Consumption
Government share of total consumption ≥ 0.75
Ordnance and accessories 6 10,287 0.80
Consumers' share of total consumption ≥ 0.75
Cleaning and toilet preparations 793 48,225 0.78
Apparel 240 121,089 0.86
Footwear, leather, and leather products 238 25,120 0.82
Other transportation equipment 94 28,423 0.76
Household appliances 79 22,417 0.80
Motor vehicles (passenger cars and trucks) 64 167,651 0.99
Tobacco products 1 45,465 0.94
Firm inputs' share of total consumption ≥ 0.75
Engines and turbines 2,823 19,113 0.97
Industrial and other chemicals 1,926 131,943 0.91
Truck and bus bodies, trailers, and motor vehicles parts 1,075 143,519 0.93
Primary iron and steel manufacturing 686 107,567 0.99
Electronic components and accessories 638 149,520 0.99
Special industry machinery and equipment 627 6,410 0.95
Farm, construction, and mining machinery 617 8,184 0.92
Electrical industrial equipment and apparatus 562 33,538 0.96
General industrial machinery and equipment 448 24,740 0.99
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 402 178,831 0.86
Glass and glass products 342 25,095 0.89
Other fabricated metal products 269 84,884 0.91
Plastics and synthetic materials 258 62,136 1.00
Primary nonferrous metals manufacturing 200 96,128 1.00
Heating, plumbing, and fabricated structural metal products 191 74,369 0.98
Stone and clay products 190 79,506 0.95
Paper and allied products, except containers 186 122,553 0.81
Metalworking machinery and equipment 155 15,338 0.89
Lumber and wood products 135 128,172 0.97
Broad and narrow fabrics, yarn and thread mills 123 43,845 0.94
Electric lighting and wiring equipment 108 30,101 0.88
Materials handling machinery and equipment 81 5,799 1.00
Screw machine products and stampings 54 56,142 0.96
Agricultural fertilizers and chemicals 48 20,615 0.84
Metal containers 34 12,886 1.00
Service industry machinery 27 25,894 0.92
Livestock and livestock products 26 101,763 0.96
Forestry and fishery products 23 22,259 0.82
Paints and allied products 16 18,223 0.89
Miscellaneous machinery, except electrical 12 37,781 0.97
Paperboard containers and boxes 12 41,590 0.98
Non-metallic minerals mining 6 16,608 1.00
Metallic ores mining 1 7,183 1.04
Product category name
Table 3.  Commodities Used Mainly by US Government, Consumers or Firms
Note: This table lists 2-digit commodity classes where share of government, consumers, or firms' intermediate inputs exceeds 75 









France*(Year>2002) -0.43 -0.45 -0.51 -0.35 -1.00 -0.97 -1.20 -0.65
(0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11)
Observations 185 180 159 77 203 203 174 84
France*(Year>2002) 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.17 -0.19 -0.19 -0.20 -0.15
(0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.21)
Observations 203 203 174 84 203 203 174 84
France*(Year>2002) -0.15 -0.14 -0.18 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Observations 203 203 174 84 203 203 174 84
NOTES. This table reports estimates of regressions of log value of trade on an indicator for France interacted with an indicator for the period after 2002, when relations between 
the two countries deteriorated. All the regressions control for exporting (importing) country fixed effects and time effects. The baseline specification uses CIF (FOB) prices in 
nominal US dollars for import (export) regressions for OECD trading partners from 1999-2005. The weighted specification uses 1999 exports (imports) as weights. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by exporting (importing) country in the panel regressions.
Table 4.  Effect of Worsening Relations between US and France on Trade, by Commodity Type
C.  Commodity groups where firm inputs' share of total US consumption in 1999 was at least 0.75
B.  Commodity groups where consumers' share of total US consumption in 1999 was at least 0.75
A.  Commodity groups where government share of total US consumption in 1999 was at least 0.75
As Baseline, Except: As Baseline, Except:
US Imports US Exports(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable (QfPf)/(QP) ln((QfPf)/(QP)) ln((QfPf)/(QP)) ln(Qf/Q) ln(Pf/P)
Year>2002 -0.014 -0.143 -0.150 -0.144 -0.006
(0.004) (0.033) (0.035) (0.053) (0.033)
Observations 4,606 4,206 3,686 3,686 3,686
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable (QfPf)/(QP) ln((QfPf)/(QP)) ln((QfPf)/(QP)) ln(Qf/Q) ln(Pf/P)
Year>2002 -0.010 -0.122 -0.126 -0.127 0.001
(0.005) (0.036) (0.040) (0.051) (0.030)
Observations 4,725 4,367 3,691 3,691 3,691
Only Commodities with Price Data
Table 5.  The Effect of Relations on France's Share of US Input Trade with Eurozone (Within 4-Digit Commodities)
NOTES. This table reports coefficients from regressions of measures of France's share of US trade with Eurozone on an indicator for the period after 2002. The data are only for 
commodities where at least 75% of US consumption in 1999 was due to firms. The dependent variable in column (1) is France's share of the value of US trade with the Eurozone; the 
dependent variable in columns (2) and (3) is the logarithm of France's share of the value of US trade with the Eurozone;  the dependent variable in column (4) is the logarithm of 
France's share of the quantity of US trade with the Eurozone; and the dependent variable in column (5) is the logarithm of the average price of French commodities divided by the 
average price of Eurozone commodities. All the regressions control for commodity fixed effects. The data are denominated in CIF (FOB) prices in nominal US dollars for US 
imports (exports) from 1999-2005. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by 4-digit commodities.
US Exports of Commodities Used Mostly as Firms' Inputs
US Imports of Commodities Used Mostly as Firms' Inputs
Only Commodities with Price Data
Entire Sample
Entire SampleCommodity Code Commodity Description Value of US Imports from France in 1999
H0-0406 Cheese and curd 78,183,168
H0-2204 Grape wines (including fortified), alcoholic grape must 1,086,000,000
H0-2208 Liqueur, spirits and undenatured ethyl alcohol <80% 581,600,000
H0-3303 Perfumes and toilet waters 528,000,000
H0-3304 Beauty, make-up and skin care preparations 151,000,000
H0-4011 New pneumatic tyres, of rubber 146,300,000
H0-4202 Trunks, suit-cases, camera cases, handbags, etc. 136,300,000
H0-6204 Women's, girl's suits, jacket, dress, skirt, etc. 88,680,159
H0-6403 Footwear with uppers of leather 56,578,197
H0-7013 Glassware for table, kitchen, toilet, decoration 170,200,000
H0-7113 Jewellery and parts, containing precious metal 63,337,494
H0-7615 Aluminium ware for table, kitchen, sanitary use 62,205,445
H0-8704 Motor vehicles for the transport of goods 53,754,587
H0-9403 Other furniture and parts thereof 89,086,955
H0-9701 Paintings, drawings, pastels, collages etc., hand made 1,458,000,000
H0-9703 Original sculptures and statuary, in any material 57,057,828
H0-9706 Antiques older than one hundred years 289,600,000
Appendix  [Not Necessarily for Publication] Table A1. Commodities Identifiable as Originating in France 
NOTES. This table report 4-digit H0 commodity groups for which, we assume, US consumers would be relatively more likely to identify a commodity as French. These 
commodity groups were chosen such that the US imported at least $50 million dollars of goods from France in 1999 in each of them.Figure 1. Fraction of US Respondents With a Favorable View of France and other European 













March 2003: US led 
coalition invades Iraq
November 2002: UN 
Resolution 1441 on 
Iraq (US compromise 
with France)
February 2002Figure 2. Change in Log Value of US Trade with France, Eurozone and OECD
(Nominal US$, Changes Relative to 1999)
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